Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2014

Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court Funding Crisis
Michael J. Graetz
Columbia Law School, mgraet@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court Funding Crisis, 143(3) DAEDALUS 96
(2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2238

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Trusting the Courts: Redressing the
State Court Funding Crisis
Michael J. Graetz
Abstract: In recent years, state courts have suffered serious funding reductions that have threatened their
ability to resolve criminal and civil cases in a timely fashion. Proposals for addressing this state court
funding crisis have emphasized public education and the creation of coalitions to influence state legislatures. These strategies are unlikely to succeed, however, and new institutional arrangements are necessary. Dedicated state trust funds using speci½c state revenue sources to fund courts offer the most promise
for adequate and stable state court funding.

Let justice be done though the heavens fall.
–Lord Mans½eld (1768)1

We Americans take it for granted that if we buy an
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automobile or marry someone and the car or spouse
turns out to be a lemon, we can go into court to
obtain relief. If we get into a dispute with our landlord or a tenant or with our family over a relative’s
estate, a judge will be sitting in the local courthouse
to resolve it. Surely, if confronted with domestic violence, we can promptly obtain a restraining order
from a court nearby. If we are wrongfully arrested
and charged with a crime, we take comfort in the fact
that our constitution provides us the rights to counsel
and a speedy trial, and we look forward to our day
in court to vindicate ourselves. If we want to validate our rights to speak and worship freely, bear
arms, or contribute vast sums to the political contender of our choice, we expect our claims to be heard
promptly and fairly in a convenient courthouse.
The judiciary is the indispensable third branch of
our democratic government, the one that peacefully
resolves our disputes and most vigorously guarantees
our liberty. Well-functioning courts are integral to
our democracy. Our expectation that we can resolve
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our legal rights in a court of law is so ingrained in our culture that we never give a
second thought to the prospect that we
might not be able to do so.
But many years of tight and frequently
declining funding have exacted a substantial toll on the capacity of our courts to
function as they should. In 2003, the Conference of State Court Administrators described state courts as facing “the worst
½scal crisis in many decades.”2 Of course,
the crisis intensi½ed when state budgets
were decimated in the wake of the Great
Recession. The heavens may not have fallen, but justice has suffered serious blows
from the budget ax.
Except in rare and extraordinary circumstances, only federal courts–especially the
U.S. Supreme Court–grab the media’s attention. This is hardly surprising: federal
court rulings frequently have nationwide
consequences. But it is the state courts that
we count on to resolve the vast majority
of our legal disputes, to ensure justice dayto-day. State courts hear more than 95 percent of all court cases ½led in the United
States. During 2011, about 370,000 civil
cases were ½led in federal courts. By comparison, California, Florida, Maryland,
New York, and Virginia each had one million or more new civil cases ½led in 2011.3
Total cases ½led in our nations’ state courts
grew from just under 90 million in 1995 to
more than 108 million in 2008.4
Until the budget sequestration hit the
courts in 2013, federal funding for the judiciary had generally increased to match
its caseload, as had the number of federal
court personnel. Even during the Great
Recession, federal court funding held relatively steady at about $7 billion a year
(two-tenths of 1 percent of the total federal budget).5 But in 2013, the federal spending sequestration legislation cut $350 million from federal court budgets, producing
furloughs and layoffs of court personnel
and causing reductions in drug testing,
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court security services, and background Graetz
checks, as well as periodic closures of the
courts that delayed their ability to resolve
cases.6 Even so, the federal courts have
fared much better than state courts, which
in recent years have had their budgets
sharply reduced.
In 2010, more than forty states cut their
courts’ funding. In most states, courts received 10 to 15 percent less funding in the
years 2008 through 2011 than they did in
2007. These cumulative budget cuts have
taken a harsh toll on state courts’ ability to
function properly: more than forty states
froze salaries; more than thirty laid off or
furloughed judicial staff and stopped
½lling clerk vacancies; nearly thirty increased their case backlogs; and more than
twenty reduced court operating hours and
increased ½ling fees and ½nes.7 Michigan
cut forty-nine judgeships, New York laid off
½ve hundred employees, Alabama closed
its state courts on Fridays, and New Hampshire essentially suspended civil jury trials.8
Delays are ubiquitous. In much of Minnesota, for example, it now takes more than
a year for a misdemeanor case to be set
for trial. Criminal cases in Georgia routinely take more than a year to resolve, while
civil trials there have been suspended
inde½nitely. Personal injury cases in New
Hampshire are commonly delayed two to
three years.9 Steve White, presiding judge
of the Sacramento County Superior Court,
told The New York Times that, due to reduced staff, people commonly wait ½ve to
six hours to see a clerk, and residents frequently wait a full day for help in family
courts, only to leave without having seen
anyone. Simultaneously, unemployment
and the threat (or the reality) of foreclosures and bankruptcy have increased family stress, making this economic downturn
an especially bad time for courts to be unable to promptly resolve legal issues related
to debtor-creditor relations, domestic rela97
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tions, and parenting-time disputes. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right
to a “speedy” trial, and domestic violence
and parental misconduct cases require immediate judicial attention, so other civil litigation goes to the back of the line. If a state
civil case ½led in 2007 took one and a half
years to be resolved, the same case ½led in
2013 would require nearly four and a half
years. In Los Angeles, the average case disposition time increased from just under two
years to four and a half years in 2012.10 Accounts of dysfunction in the state courts
could ½ll this volume. If justice delayed is,
in fact, justice denied, injustice abounds.
The National Center for State Courts
(ncsc), the American Bar Association
(aba), and many state courts and bar associations have well documented the deleterious consequences of the declines in
state court budgets. The ncsc and aba
have both conducted and funded excellent
reports on the effects of inadequate funding of state judiciaries and have advanced
several proposals to address the problems
they uncovered.11 The ncsc concluded
that due to decreased state budgets for the
judiciary, “the public’s access to justice is
being jeopardized.”12 Both organizations
have published numerous calls for greater
efforts by judicial of½cials and their allies
to obtain adequate funding from state
legislatures.
David Boies and Ted Olson–the famous
adversaries in Bush v. Gore (2000) who
subsequently joined forces to contest California’s ban on gay marriage–teamed up
again (far from the national spotlight) to
cochair the aba’s Task Force on Preservation of the Justice System. At the aba’s
annual meeting in August 2011, Boies and
Olson received the association’s highest
honor for their leadership of this task force,
which, after conducting numerous fact½nding hearings around the country, concluded that “the courts of our country are
in crisis” due to the “failure of state and

local legislatures to provide adequate funding.”13 In 2011, the task force obtained
unanimous approval for aba House of Delegates Resolution 302, which urges state
and local bar associations “to document
the impact of funding cuts to the justice
systems in their jurisdictions, to publicize
the effects of those cutbacks, and to create
coalitions to address and respond to the
rami½cations of funding shortages to their
justice systems.”14
No one now denies that the funding
problems of state courts are causing serious harm. The adverse consequences have
spread far beyond litigants and court personnel. The aba Task Force Report documented detrimental effects on public safety, ranging from increased travel and delays
for police of½cers waiting to testify at criminal trials to releases of criminal defendants when their speedy trial clocks run
out. Cutbacks in courthouse security personnel have increased the risks inside
courthouses. Delays in domestic violence
cases can have tragic consequences.
State court funding reductions are also
costly to the regional economy. Economic
losses include not only the direct effects of
state employment reductions and lower
revenues for the adjacent legal community,
but also decreased investment, since funds
are held in reserve for longer pending resolution of legal disputes.15 When uncertainty rises regarding the likelihood of ef½cacious judicial enforcement of property
and contract rights, investment ½nancing
becomes more dif½cult to obtain, economic risks increase, and economically bene½cial transactions simply may not occur.
Writing in the Journal of Public Economics,
economist Matthieu Chemin concluded
that “[f]inding ways to speed up judiciaries
is . . . fundamental to economic growth.”16
One microeconomic study estimated that
in 2012, cutbacks in state judiciary funding would eventually “result in estimated
losses of $53.3 billion from increased un-
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certainty on the part of litigants,” not including “losses from declines in employment at state judiciaries, law ½rms and the
resulting declines in economic output . . .
resulting from the funding cutbacks.”17
The ongoing shrinkage of state court
resources also encourages those who can
afford it to seek alternatives to courts for
resolving disputes. Increasing use of arbitration, mediation, and “private” judges
raises complex and cross-cutting issues
well beyond the scope of this essay. It suf½ces here to observe that, advantages to
litigants notwithstanding, the emergence
and evolution of a two-tier system of justice poses substantial risks for state judicial systems. If complex business cases and
other controversies among those who can
afford private adjudication flee the judicial system, leaving state courts to resolve
cases principally involving criminal defendants and the poor and powerless, it will
become increasingly dif½cult to attract and
retain high-quality state court judges (and
other personnel). In turn, the temptation
for state legislatures to further decrease
state court funding will grow. As U.S. District Court Judge Jack Weinstein has observed, “This would create a situation analogous to what has happened to public education in some of our central cities because
of the middle class exodus to private
schools and the suburbs.”18
In 1970, Warren Burger, then the Chief
Justice of the United States, told the American Bar Association:
A sense of con½dence in the courts is essential to maintain the fabric of ordered liberty
for a free people and three things could destroy that con½dence and do incalculable
damage to society: that people come to believe that inef½ciency and delay will drain
even a just judgment of its value; that people who have long been exploited in the
smaller transactions of daily life come to believe that courts cannot vindicate their legal
rights from fraud and over-reaching; that
143 (3) Summer 2014

people come to believe that the law–in the Michael J.
larger sense–cannot ful½ll its primary func- Graetz
tion to protect them and their families in
their homes, at their work, and on the public
streets.19

These threats to our system of justice are
now being posed a generation later by the
inadequate funding of state courts.

The facts of diminished funding of state

courts are indisputable. The harmful consequences of funding cutbacks have been
well-documented and are now clear. The
question of how to redress this situation,
however, remains.
State courts obviously must improve
their ef½ciency and enhance their costeffectiveness. Approximately 95 percent of
annual state court costs are for personnel,
which means that the diminished funding
has left vacancies un½lled and has produced
furloughs and ½rings. It also implies that
too little is being spent on technology. In
some cases, funding reductions have produced efforts to “re-engineer” state courts,
reorganizing them in order to curtail duplicative costs (perhaps most notable among
these efforts is the consolidation of trial
courts in California). The push for cost savings has also stimulated more electronic
payment, document management, and ½lings of court documents; video conferencing in rural areas; forms downloadable
from the web; and online answers to questions–in short, a general increase in the
online accessibility of court services. Procedures and forms for straightforward
cases, like uncontested divorces and small
claims, have been greatly simpli½ed in
some states. So, the funding reductions
have stimulated some improvements in the
courts, prompting them to enhance and
streamline services in order to better serve
the public. Such enhancements should continue to be implemented and spread to
other states.
99
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But on a less positive note, many state
courts have responded to cuts by endeavoring to increase their self-funding, principally by raising ½ling and other fees, but
also by raising ½nes. In Washington, the imposition of new surcharges and increased
fees spurred the state Supreme Court in
2013 to reaf½rm indigent litigants’ rights to
waiver of all fees.20 To be sure, although increases in fees may deter low- and middleincome litigants from seeking relief, they
may be necessary in some cases. But on the
other hand, raising ½nes to fund court functions is never apt: it conflicts with the impartiality in setting punishments that we
expect and deserve from the judiciary.
Historically, state and local judicial functions were largely conducted by judges
elected and funded locally. But the court
reform movement of the mid-twentieth
century changed that, and state courts are
now typically uni½ed, and in most states
are under the administrative control of the
state Supreme Court and at least partly
funded by the state.21 This uni½cation,
along with political pressure to limit property taxes (the prime source of local funds),
and a striving for greater stability and uniformity of funding statewide, has provided
an impetus to shift funding of state courts
to state rather than local budgets. Today,
although there are variations among the
states, the vast bulk of state court funds
are supplied through state budgets.22 These
budgets are determined (usually annually)
by state legislators. Funds allocated to the
judiciary are generally 1 to 2 percent of state
budgets, although in a few states they range
as high as 3 or 4 percent.
There is a surprising consistency in the
recommendations for redressing the state
court funding crisis and avoiding similar
de½cits in the future. The recommendations of the aba Task Force in their report
“Crisis in the Courts,” which were endorsed unanimously by the aba House of
Delegates, are typical. Echoing the ½ndings

of virtually all such analyses, the Task Force
½rst urges achieving operating ef½ciencies
in the courts. The task force report also
urges state and local bar associations to:
1) “document the impact of funding cutbacks to the justice systems in their jurisdictions”; 2) “publicize the effects of those
cutbacks”; and 3) “create coalitions to address and respond to the rami½cations of
funding shortages to their justice systems.”
The aba also recommends that state and
local governments “develop principles that
would provide for stable and predictable
levels of funding.” Furthermore, it urges
both the courts and bar associations to better communicate with and educate public
of½cials and the public about the “value of
adequately funding the justice system.”23
The ncsc has endorsed a similar strategy,
calling for more engagement with the legislatures by state chief justices, “regular
meetings” between the judiciary and legislative bodies, and “strong alliances” between state and local bar associations and
other constituents.24 State bar associations and other independent analysts have
advanced similar recommendations.
Mustering any con½dence in the potential success of such strategies, however, is
dif½cult, not least because of a lack of public concern. As Paul De Muniz, the former
Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court,
observed in a report for the ncsc: “The
court funding crisis is ‘not being talked
about around the dinner tables of America.’”25 Putting aside the fact that the American public rarely gathers around dinner
tables anymore, such calls for greater public engagement as a response to inadequate
state court funding of state judicial systems face serious obstacles. First, only 13
percent of the public has a “great deal of
con½dence” in state courts (although by
this metric, they fare twice as well as state
legislatures and four times better than Congress).26 Moreover, state court funding is
not a salient issue with the American peo-
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ple, who are dealing with far more immediate concerns. When Americans are asked
about needs for greater state funding, public schools, roads and bridges, health insurance, public transportation, and the police
all enjoy at least twice as much public support as state courts.27 At most, the public
will give media articles about acute judicial
funding shortages and their consequences
a brief glance. Public contact with state
courts is episodic, and (in family, probate,
or traf½c courts, for example) can often
be disappointing or even distressing. Endeavoring to engage the public in creating
an effective ongoing political coalition to
convince state legislatures to provide “adequate, stable, and predictable” judiciary
funding is a distracting delusion.
Only fundamental institutional change
has the potential to protect the judiciary
from the vagaries of annual state legislative
budgeting. But despite all the time, energy,
and ink devoted to the crisis in funding
state judiciaries–including widespread
complaints about the threats funding
shortages pose to the constitutional independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers, as well as a few instances
where funding cutbacks have served as
“payback” for judicial decisions key legislators disliked–new institutional arrangements have not been advanced. To be sure,
achieving successful institutional change
is easier said than done.

What new institutional arrangements

would signi½cantly enhance protections
for stable judiciary funding? First, a multiyear perspective seems necessary. This suggests that a state “trust fund” might be a
viable solution. Trust funds, which typically earmark a speci½c source of revenue for
a particular spending purpose, are widely
used by the federal and state governments.
At the federal level, the trust funds directing payroll taxes to Social Security and
Medicare and the trust fund allocating gas-
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are the best known, but the United States Graetz
Code lists ninety-one trust funds, including, for example, funds for the Philippines,
the Library of Congress, Puerto Rico, and
certain veterans’ bene½ts.28 The states also
maintain trust funds for a large variety of
purposes: Wyoming has a trust fund for
wildlife and natural resource conservation;
Wisconsin and several other states use
them for prevention of child abuse and neglect; and California and many other states
employ them to pay for affordable housing,
to name just a few examples. Many states
have created trust funds for spending the
proceeds of their settlements with tobacco
companies, and all the states maintain trust
funds for unemployment insurance.
As political scientist Eric Patashnik has
reported, trust funds–while frequently
neither legally binding on the legislature
nor necessarily economically signi½cant–
have been quite successful in producing
politically stable long-term funding commitments.29 A state trust fund with earmarked revenues devoted to funding the
state’s judicial branch would provide state
judiciaries with much more stable and predictable funding over time. Trust fund ½nancing would also help insulate the judicial branch from funding cuts from state
legislators who may disapprove of speci½c
court decisions. A state trust fund would
also serve to fortify the judiciary’s independence from the executive and legislative branches’ political pressures, thereby
strengthening the separation of powers
mandated in state constitutions.
Calling for trust fund ½nancing for the
judiciary raises two additional questions:
1) from what revenue sources will the trust
funds come; and 2) who will determine the
level and timing of withdrawals? The second question is considerably easier to answer than the ½rst. Allowing the judicial
branch itself to manage withdrawals would
have the salutary effect of freeing the ju101
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diciary from detailed legislative directives
about how its budget must be spent. It
would also discourage “pork-barrel” legislative politics and executive line-item
vetoes. This kind of judicial budgetary independence would also better position
legislatures to hold the judicial branch responsible for serving the public interest.
Spending flexibility and control should be
granted to the judicial branch on the condition that it achieve ef½ciency and economy in the adjudication process. The judicial
branch would thus bene½t from its own
successes but also bear the costs of its
failures.
Given the wide variations in public ½nance among the states, determining the
revenue sources for the trust funds is considerably more dif½cult. These variations
include not only differences in the sources
and levels of state funds and the share of
each state’s budget dedicated to ½nancing
the judiciary, but also interstate disparities
in the proportion and levels of state versus
local ½nancing of the courts. As a general
observation, two criteria emerge: 1) the
funding source should be adequate; and
2) the revenue should come from a source
that will not be dramatically affected by
changes in the state’s economic well-being.
For most states, dedicating a portion of
state sales tax revenues equal to 1 to 2 percent of overall state expenditures to a state

court trust fund would satisfy both criteria.30 Court ½ling and other fees should
also go into the trust fund. (Court ½nes,
however, should be directed to general revenues because of the potential for conflicts
of interest and risk of undermining the
public’s con½dence in judicial integrity.)
This combination of revenues should provide an adequate and relatively stable and
predictable source of funds for courts in
most states.
The political dif½culties of convincing
state legislatures to create such trust funds
for funding their judiciaries loom large. If
the endeavor to secure annual funding is
any indication, creating a coalition that can
persuade state legislatures is an immense
challenge. But if successful, such efforts
would not need to be repeated annually.
Creating a trust fund for state court ½nances would be a far more fruitful avenue
than relying on successful public education and annual coalition-building, which
have up to this point been at the forefront
of efforts to address the crises caused by
inadequate state court funding. The deleterious effects of recent shortfalls in state
court funding may have opened up new opportunities for fundamental institutional
change. The courts and their allies should
endeavor to take advantage of such opportunities wherever they exist.
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